I turned to the development o cer and asked, "What's our agenda here this morning?" The donor interrupted to say that he wanted to buy me a ticket to the Heartland Institute's Fourth Annual Conference on Climate Change, the leading climate skeptics conference. I checked my calendar and, citing prior commitments, politely declined. The meeting soon ended.
I spent the morning trying to make sense of the encounter. At rst, all I could see was a bait and switch; the donor had no interest in funding research in business and the environment, but instead wanted to criticize the e ort. I dismissed him as an irrational zealot, but the meeting lingered in my mind. The more I thought about it, the more I began to see that he was speaking from a coherent and consistent worldview-one I did not agree with, but which was a coherent viewpoint nonetheless. Plus, he had come to evangelize me. The more I thought about it, the more I became eager to learn about where he was coming from, where I was coming from, and why our two worldviews clashed so strongly in the present social debate over climate science. Ironically, in his desire to challenge my research, he stimulated a new research stream, one that t perfectly with my broader research agenda on social, institutional, and cultural change. individual preferences, but from societal norms; beliefs that represent those on the political left, right, and center as well as those whose cultural identi cations are urban, rural, religious, agnostic, young, One might expect the converse to be true of National Public Radio listeners. The result of this cultural processing and group cohesion dynamics leads to two overriding conclusions about the climate change debate.
Scienti c vs. Social Consensus
First, climate change is not a "pollution" issue. Although the US Supreme Court decided in 2007 that greenhouse gases were legally an air pollutant, in a cultural sense, they are something far di erent. The reduction of greenhouse gases is not the same as the reduction of sulfur oxides, nitrogen oxides, carbon monoxide, or particulates. These forms of pollution are man-made, they are harmful, and they are the unintended waste products of industrial production. Ideally, we would like to eliminate their production through the mobilization of economic and technical resources. But the chief greenhouse gas, carbon dioxide, is both man-made and natural. It is not inherently harmful; it is a natural part of the natural systems; and we do not desire to eliminate its production. It is not a toxic waste or a strictly technical problem to be solved. Rather, it is an endemic part of our society and who we are. To a large degree, it is a highly desirable output, as it correlates with our standard of living. Greenhouse gas emissions rise with a rise in a nation's wealth, something all people want. To reduce carbon dioxide requires an alteration in nearly every facet of the economy, and therefore nearly every facet of our culture. To recognize greenhouse gases as a problem requires us to change a great deal about how we view the world and ourselves within it. And that leads to the second distinction.
Climate change is an existential challenge to our contemporary worldviews. The cultural challenge of climate change is enormous and threefold, each facet leading to the next. The rst facet is that we have to think of a formerly benign, even bene cial, material in a new way-as a relative, not absolute, hazard.
Only in an imbalanced concentration does it become problematic. But to understand and accept this, we need to conceive of the global ecosystem in a new way.
This challenge leads us to the second facet: Not only do we have to change our view of the ecosystem, but we also have to change our view of our place within it. Have we as a species grown to such numbers, and has our technology grown to such power, that we can alter and manage the ecosystem on a planetary scale? This is an enormous cultural question that alters our worldviews. As a result, some see the question and subsequent answer as intellectual and spiritual hubris, but others see it as self-evident.
If we answer this question in the a rmative, the third facet challenges us to consider new and perhaps unprecedented forms of global ethics and governance to address it. Climate change is the ultimate "commons problem," as ecologist Garrett Hardin de ned it, where every individual has an incentive to emit greenhouse gases to improve her standard of living, but the costs of this activity are borne by all.
Unfortunately, the distribution of costs in this global issue is asymmetrical, with vulnerable populations in poor countries bearing the larger burden. So we need to rethink our ethics to keep pace with our technological abilities. Does mowing the lawn or driving a fuel-ine cient car in Ann Arbor, Mich., have ethical implications for the people living in low-lying areas of Bangladesh? If you accept anthropogenic climate change, then the answer to this question is yes, and we must develop global institutions to re ect that recognition. This is an issue of global ethics and governance on a scale that we have never seen, a ecting virtually every economic activity on the globe and requiring the most complicated and intrusive global agreement ever negotiated.
Taken together, these three facets of our existential challenge illustrate the magnitude of the cultural debate that climate change provokes. Climate change challenges us to examine previously unexamined beliefs and worldviews. It acts as a ash point (albeit a massive one) for deeper cultural and ideological con icts that lie at the root of many of our environmental problems, and it includes di ering conceptions of science, economics, religion, psychology, media, development, and governance. It is a proxy for "deeper con icts over alternative visions of the future and competing centers of authority in prosperity, feel entitled to keep it, and will not accept restraints or support government e orts to impose restraints. 6 Government-led investment in alternative energy sources, therefore, becomes more 
Techniques for a Consensus-Based Discussion
In seeking a social consensus on climate change, discussion must move beyond a strict focus on the technical aspects of the science to include its cultural underpinnings. Below are eight techniques for overcoming the ideological lters that underpin the social debate about climate change. that are closed to debate or engagement. The polarity of these groups is well known: On the one side, climate change is a hoax, humans have no impact on the climate, and nothing is happening; on the other side, climate change is an imminent crisis that will devastate the Earth, and human activity explains all climate changes.
The challenge is to move the debate away from the loud minorities at the extremes and to engage the majority in the middle-the "concerned," the "cautious," the Are greenhouse gas concentrations increasing in the atmosphere? Yes. This is a scienti c question, based on rigorous data and measurements of atmospheric chemistry and science.
Does this increase lead to a general warming of the planet? Yes. This is also a scienti c question; the chemical mechanics of the greenhouse e ect and "negative radiative forcing" are well established.
Has climate changed over the past century? Yes. Global temperature increases have been rigorously measured through multiple techniques and strongly supported by multiple scienti c analyses.In fact, as Yale University economist William Nordhaus wrote in the March 12, 2012, New York Times, "The nding that global temperatures are rising over the last century-plus is one of the most robust ndings in climate science and statistics."
Are humans partially responsible for this increase? The answer to this question is a matter of scienti c judgment. Increases in global mean temperatures have a very strong correlation with increases in man-made greenhouse gases since the Industrial Revolution. Although science cannot con rm causation, ngerprint analysis of multiple possible causes has been examined, and the only plausible explanation is that of human-induced temperature changes. Until a plausible alternative hypothesis is presented, this explanation prevails for the scienti c community.
Will the climate continue to change over the next century? Again, this question is a matter of scienti c judgment. But given the answers to the previous four questions, it is reasonable to believe that continued increases in greenhouse gases will lead to continued changes in the climate.
What will be the environmental and social impact of such change? This is the scienti c question with the greatest uncertainty. The answer comprises a bell curve of possible outcomes and varying associated probabilities, from low to extreme impact. Uncertainty in this variation is due to limited current data on the Earth's climate system, imperfect modeling of these physical processes, and the unpredictability of human actions that can both exacerbate or moderate the climate shifts. These uncertainties make predictions di cult and are an area in which much debate can take place. And yet the physical impacts of climate change are already becoming visible in ways that are consistent with scienti c modeling, particularly in Greenland, the Arctic, the Antarctic, and low-lying islands.
In asking these questions, a central consideration is whether people recognize the level of scienti c consensus associated with each one. In fact, studies have shown that people's support for climate to correlate with lower concern among conservatives and Republicans and greater concern among liberals and Democrats. Research also has found that once people have made up their minds on the science of the climate issue, providing continued scienti c evidence actually makes them more resolute in resisting conclusions that are at variance with their cultural beliefs. 9 One needs to recognize that reasoning is su used with emotion and people often use reasoning to reach a predetermined end that ts their cultural worldviews. When people hear about climate change, they may, for example, hear an implicit criticism that their lifestyle is the cause of the issue or that they are morally de cient for not recognizing it. But emotion can be a useful ally; it can create the abiding commitments needed to sustain action on the di cult issue of climate change. To do this, people must be convinced that something can be done to address it; that the challenge is not too great nor are its impacts preordained.
The key to engaging people in a consensus-driven debate about climate change is to confront the emotionality of the issue and then address the deeper ideological values that may be threatened to create this emotionality.
Focus on broker frames | People interpret information by tting it to preexisting narratives or issue categories that mesh with their worldview. Therefore information must be presented in a form that ts those templates, using carefully researched metaphors, allusions, and examples that trigger a new way of thinking about the personal relevance of climate change. To be e ective, climate communicators must use the language of the cultural community they are engaging. For a business audience, for example, one must use business terminology, such as net present value, return on investment, increased consumer demand, and rising raw material costs.
More generally, one can seek possible broker frames that move away from a pessimistic appeal to fear and instead focus on optimistic appeals that trigger the emotionality of a desired future. In addressing climate change, we are asking who we strive to be as a people, and what kind of world we want to leave our children. To gain buy-in, one can stress American know-how and our capacity to innovate, focusing on activities already under way by cities, citizens, and businesses. 10 This approach frames climate change mitigation as a gain rather than a loss to speci c cultural groups.
Research has shown that climate skepticism can be caused by a motivational tendency to defend the status quo based on the prior assumption that any change will be painful. But by encouraging people to regard pro-environmental change as patriotic and consistent with protecting the status quo, it can be framed as a continuation rather than a departure from the past.
Speci c broker frames can be used that engage the interests of both sides of the debate. One broker frame that deserves particular attention is the replacement of uncertainty or probability of climate change with the risk of climate change. 11 People understand low probability, high consequence events and the need to address them. For example, they buy re insurance for their homes even though the probability of a re is low, because they understand that the nancial consequence is too great. In the same way, climate change for some may be perceived as a low risk, high consequence event, so the prudent course of action is to obtain insurance in the form of both behavioral and technological change.
Recognize the power of language and terminology | Words have multiple meanings in di erent communities, and terms can trigger unintended reactions in a target audience. For example, one study has shown that Republicans were less likely to think that the phenomenon is real when it is referred to as "global warming" (44 percent) rather than "climate change" (60 percent), but Democrats were una ected by the term (87 percent vs. 86 percent). So language matters: The partisan divide dropped from 43 percent under a "global warming" frame to 26 percent under a "climate change" frame. 12 Other terms with multiple meanings include "climate denier," which some use to refer to those who are not open to discussion on the issue, and others see as a thinly veiled and highly insulting reference to "Holocaust denier"; "uncertainty," which is a scienti c concept to convey variance or deviation from a speci c value, but is interpreted by a lay audience to mean that scientists do not know the answer; and "consensus," which is the process by which the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) forms its position, but leads some in the public to believe that climate science is a matter of "opinion" rather than data and modeling.
Overall, the challenge becomes one of framing complex scienti c issues in a language that a lay and highly politicized audience can hear. This becomes increasingly challenging when we address some inherently nonintuitive and complex aspects of climate modeling that are hard to explain, such as the importance of feedback loops, time delays, accumulations, and nonlinearities in dynamic systems. 13 Unless scientists can accurately convey the nature of climate modeling, others in the social debate will alter their claims to t their cultural or cognitive perceptions or satisfy their political interests. Because a majority of Republicans do not believe the science of climate change, whereas a majority of Democrats do, the most e ective broker would come from the political right. Climate brokers can include representatives from business, the religious community, the entertainment industry, the military, talk show hosts, and politicians who can frame climate change in language that will engage the audience to whom they most directly connect. When people hear about the need to address climate change from their church, synagogue, mosque, or temple, for example, they w ill connect the issue to their moral values. When they hear it from their business leaders and investment managers, they will connect it to their economic interests. And when they hear it from their military leaders, they will connect it to their interest in a safe and secure nation.
Recognize as less uncertain, and feel more con dent that we must take actions to mitigate its e ects. For example, in explaining the recent increase in belief in climate change among Americans, the 2012 National Survey of American Public Opinion on Climate Change noted that "about half of Americans now point to observations of temperature changes and weather as the main reasons they believe global warming is taking place." 15 Ending Climate Science Wars
Will we see a social consensus on climate change? If beliefs about the existence of global warming are becoming more ideologically entrenched and gaps between conservatives and liberals are widening, the solution space for resolving the issue will collapse and the debate will be based on power and coercion.
In such a scenario, domination by the science-based forces looks less likely than domination by the forces of skepticism, because the former has to "prove" its case while the latter merely needs to cast doubt. But such a polarized outcome is not a predetermined outcome. And if it were to form, it can be reversed.
Is there a reason to be hopeful? When looking for reasons to be hopeful about a social consensus on climate change, I look to public opinion changes around cigarette smoking and cancer. For years, the scienti c community recognized that the preponderance of epidemiological and mechanistic data pointed to a link between the habit and the disease. And for years, the public rejected that conclusion.
But through a process of political, economic, social, and legal debate over values and beliefs, a social consensus emerged. The general public now accepts that cigarettes cause cancer and governments have set policy to address this. Interestingly, two powerful forces that many see as obstacles to a comparable social consensus on climate change were overcome in the cigarette debate.
The rst obstacle is the powerful lobby of industrial forces that can resist a social and political consensus. In the case of the cigarette debate, powerful economic interests mounted a campaign to obfuscate the scienti c evidence and to block a social and political consensus. Tobacco companies created their own pro-tobacco science, but eventually the public health community overcame protobacco scientists.
The second obstacle to convincing a skeptical public is the lack of a de nitive statement by the scienti c community about the future implications of climate change. The 2007 IPCC report states that "Human activities … are modifying the concentration of atmospheric constituents … that absorb or scatter radiant energy. … [M]ost of the observed warming over the last 50 years is very likely to have been due to the increase in greenhouse gas emissions." Some point to the word "likely" to argue that scientists still don't know and action in unwarranted. But science is not designed to provide a de nitive smoking gun.
Remember that the 1964 surgeon general's report about the dangers of smoking was equally conditional. And even today, we cannot state with scienti c certainty that smoking causes lung cancer.
Like the global climate, the human body is too complex a system for absolute certainty. We can explain epidemiologically why a person could get cancer from cigarette smoking and statistically how that person will likely get cancer, but, as the surgeon general report explains, "statistical methods cannot establish proof of a causal relationship in an association [between cigarette smoking and lung cancer].
The causal signi cance of an association is a matter of judgment, which goes beyond any statement of statistical probability." Yet the general public now accepts this causal linkage.
What will get us there? Although climate brokers are needed from all areas of society-from business, religion, military, and politics-one eld in particular needs to become more engaged: the academic scientist and particularly the social scientist. Too much of the debate is dominated by the physical sciences in de ning the problem and by economics in de ning the solutions. Both elds focus heavily on the rational and quantitative treatments of the issue and fail to capture the behavioral and cultural aspects that explain why people accept or reject scienti c evidence, analysis, and conclusions. But science is never socially or politically inert, and scientists have a duty to recognize its e ect on society and to communicate that e ect to society. Social scientists can help in this endeavor.
But the relative absence of the social sciences in the climate debate is driven by speci c structural and institutional controls that channel research work away from empirical relevance. Social scientists limit involvement in such "outside" activities, because the underlying norms of what is considered legitimate and valuable research, as well as the overt incentives and reward structures within the academy, lead away from such endeavors. Tenure and promotion are based primarily on the publication of top-tier academic journal articles. This is the signal of merit and success. Any e ort on any other endeavor is decidedly discouraged.
The role of the public intellectual has become an arcane and elusive option in today's social sciences.
Moreover, it is a di cult role to play. The academic rules are not clear and the public backlash can be uncomfortable; many of my colleagues and I are regular recipients of hostile e-mail messages and webbased attacks. But the lack of academic scientists in the public debate harms society by leaving out critical voices for informing and resolving the climate debate. There are signs, however, that this model of scholarly isolation is changing. Some leaders within the eld have begun to call for more engagement within the public arena as a way to invigorate the discipline and underscore its investment in the defense of civil society. As members of society, all scientists have a responsibility to bring their expertise to the decision-making process. It is time for social scientists to accept this responsibility. 
